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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 11/07/2011 Accident number: 744 
Accident time: 09:20 Accident Date: 11/05/2009 
Where it occurred: AF/0107/00006, HT-






Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 22/06/2009 
ID original source: None Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN-2 AP blast Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 11/07/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons 
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting 
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more 
information becomes available. 
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The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
File date: 22nd June 2009 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] EOD-06 DEMINING ACCIDENT 
INTRODUCTION:  
An investigation team was convened by AMAC Central to investigate the de-mining accident 
involving [the Victim] the De-miner from [Demining group] EOD-06. The accident occurred at 
9:20 hours on 11 May 2009 at minefield number AF/0107/00006/HT-1736, located in Deh 
Yaqoob village in Tapa-e-Bamboori, Shakardara district of Kabul province.                                                                
SUMMARY: 
Minefield # AF/0107/00006/HT-1736 is an anti-personnel contaminated site which was 
surveyed by [Other demining group] on May 2007 under the community # HQ 1300 SHA -01. 
This area was mined by Russian backed government during the year 1985 and then during 
internal war in year 1998. This site was a military post and around 11 accidents happened 
there 9 on human killed 8 and injured 1 and 2 accident on animal.  
On 04 April 2009, [Demining group] EOD-01and 04 started de-mining operation in mentioned 
MF and then on 04 may 2009 the task has been handed over to [Demining group] EOD-06 
and 07. Size of the MF is 4200 sqm and around 514 sqm area has been cleared, not any 
mine or UXO were discovered/destroyed by the team till the accident happened. 
On 11 May 2009 at 09:20 the de-miner [the Victim] was excavating a detected signal in his 
clearance lane, he stroked the top of a PMN2 mine with his bayonet and the accident 
happened. As the ground profile is uneven and the accident occurred in an area where the 
extra soil is brought by seasonal floods and the depth of mine was around 25cm. The deminer 
failed to go deeper as per procedure and discover the mine properly, so he stroked the mine 
and caused the accident. According to the investigation report and the pictures of victim 
deminer the visor was not used properly, but it was kept up during excavation drill. As a result 
of accident he got injuries on his right eye, face and right ear, he has also got some injuries 
on his right arm.   
CONCLUSIONS: 
However the carelessness of deminer and poor supervision are the causes of accident, but 
the root cause of this accident is going a step back to management level and it is described 
as bellow:  
• This small size area was started by 2 EOD teams, but their activities have not been 
measured; it proves inadequate management of the operation. 
• The first 2 EOD teams handed over the site to another 2 EOD teams, but without any 
record and documentation or marking in the site 
• The first 2 EOD teams cleared an area of 200 sqm in almost 23 days, but nobody 
from [Demining group] operations have monitored team’s performance during the 
mentioned period as proper as required. 
• There was lack of documentation at all e.g. site clearance plan, minefield report, free 
hand sketch map, visitor log, daily operations report and any other relevant report 
with the team. 
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• There is not any record of internal QA were available with team nor team was visited 
by operations within the mentioned period. 
• As there was lack of documentation at all, the cleared portion of area by previous 
team was re-cleared by existing 2 EOD teams. 
• Both EOD teams need revision course in manual clearance methodology, which has 
not considered and this was the first manual clearance drill for EOD team since 1998. 
All above listed points are non conformity in some cases as major to the [Demining group] 
operational procedure; consequently they are making the contributing factors to this accident. 
RECOMMENDATIONS:  
The following points are to be considered: 
• The operations and QA department of [Demining group] are recommended to 
strongly consider the points mentioned in conclusion. 
• AMAC Kabul is recommended to prepare a comprehensive QA plan and conduct the 
QA accordingly. 
• Any shortfalls should be covered and reported on the time for immediate remedial 
action. 
• Feedback on any preventive and constrictive actions taken by [Demining group] is 
required to be submitted to the MACCA office by no later than 7 days, effective to the 
issue date of this letter. 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 935 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: minor Arm; severe Eye; severe Face 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "he got injuries on his right eye, face and 
right ear, he has also got some injuries on his right arm". 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Management Control Inadequacy because 
the investigators found that there were significant management failings at the site, including a 
failing to record the cleared area and to monitor activities. The secondary cause is listed as a 
Field Control Inadequacy because the Victim was working with his visor raised and his error 
was not corrected. The investigators finding that retraining was necessary was also a 
significant Management Control Inadequacy. 
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The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years, 
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have 
been more responsible than those internationals who presume greater responsibility. 
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